Tuesday, November 29, 2005
The value of legislative expertise
Amar85 [FN89]. The value of legislative "expertise" has probably been overestimated. The proper function of
the legislature is not to draft narrow, technical codes, but to make basic policy choices by setting
priorities among competing values and establishing the general contours of acceptable tradeoffs. See
J.S. MILL, supra note 38, at 68-84. Ironically, current legislatures often fail to address fundamental
issues while enacting extremely complex statutory schemes. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Congress refused to
strike basic tradeoff between safety and profits).
the legislature is not to draft narrow, technical codes, but to make basic policy choices by setting
priorities among competing values and establishing the general contours of acceptable tradeoffs. See
J.S. MILL, supra note 38, at 68-84. Ironically, current legislatures often fail to address fundamental
issues while enacting extremely complex statutory schemes. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Congress refused to
strike basic tradeoff between safety and profits).
Transferable selection (lettery voting) vs. nontransferable (pure lottery)
A history of elections
Greek elections, Roman elections, British elections
References:
Amar 84, 95 (online)
Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality
by Jon Elster (also online)
Demarchy
A citizen legislature
Duxbury
Random Selection in Politics
Carson, Lyn; Martin, Brian
The principles of representative government
MANIN, BERNARD
Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality
by Jon Elster (also online)
Demarchy
A citizen legislature
Duxbury
Random Selection in Politics
Carson, Lyn; Martin, Brian
The principles of representative government
MANIN, BERNARD
Statistical aspects
Fallacy of the "Marketplace View of Representation"
Pork
Electoral (or political) business cycle
http://ceterisparibus.uprm.edu/articulos/vol3/articulo7.htm
Electoral (or political) business cycle
http://ceterisparibus.uprm.edu/articulos/vol3/articulo7.htm
Refuting Elster's and Duxbury's arguments against sortition
Sunday, November 27, 2005
How do the electable become electable?
Tracking mentions of candidates in the press over time
Arguments against sortition are those against democracy
Oligarchy of the well-known
Only the well-known are electable
Elections work only for small groups
Athenian democracy
Sortition - the real democracy
Random election of representatives
Putting the demos back in democracy
Putting the demos back in democracy
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